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Abstract: The Danish model won fame for its performance during the 1990s and
the beginning of the 2000-years and took a position as a model for the European
Employment Strategy and a much cited example of a real life flexicurity model.
Like most other European countries Denmark has now fallen into a deep economic
crisis. This has created debates about the ability of the Danish model to sustain external
chocks. Some have further argued that Danish employment will be more vulnerable to
economic downturns due to the low level of employment protection legislation (EPL).
These issues are in the focus of the present article, which describes the reactions of the
Danish employment system to the economic crisis and the relationship between the
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Denmark received considerable international attention during the decade before the
economic crisis. The flashing of the highest employment rate in the EU, the low level
of unemployment and an overall positive macroeconomic performance made Denmark
stand out as a best practice for Europe (Madsen, 2006; Bredgaard et al, 2006, 2007).
Furthermore Denmark showed some interesting traits, when it came to the country’s
combination of the basic building blocks of a Nordic welfare state with some charac-
teristics of more liberal market economies. The Danish development of the welfare
state and labour market was thus seen as a successful hybrid between the flexible
labour markets in the liberal welfare states characterised by high numerical flexibility
(liberal hiring-and-firing rules) and the Scandinavian welfare regimes of generous
social security. The hybrid model seemingly managed to reconcile the dynamic forces
of the free market economy with the social security of the Scandinavian welfare states
(Madsen, 2006).
Under the heading of “flexicurity”, the Danish labour market model was therefore
cast in terms of a well-functioning relationship between low job protection, a flexible
labour market, high levels of unemployment insurance and active labour market pol-
icies (Bredgaard et al, 2006). In the wider European discourse of flexicurity, Denmark
was rapidly endorsed as inspiration for a European Social Model that should guide the2013 Madsen; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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mission, 2006).
Since 2008, Denmark has like most other European countries fallen into a deep re-
cession. This was the combined result of the steep decline in the international economy
and the bursting of a national housing bubble that had developed in since the begin-
ning of the decade and accelerated after 2005. From the peak of the business cycle in
the spring of 2008 to the bottom of the crisis a year later, Danish GDP fell by 8 percent
on a quarterly basis. Reacting more slowly to the downturn, total employment reached
its lowest level in the first quarter of 2012, having declined by 7.7 percent. The un-
employment rates increased dramatically from 3.1 percent in the second quarter of
2008 to 8.2 percent in the beginning of 2011. From having had one of the lowest levels
of unemployment in the EU, Denmark moved close to the middle of the rank.
This has stimulated debates about the ability of the Danish model to sustain external
chocks and a strand of literature has developed, which discusses the fate of the Danish
model of flexicurity in times of crisis sometimes in a comparative perspective (Andersen,
2012; Andersen and Svarer, 2012; Eichhorst et al, 2010; Leschke & Watt, 2010; OECD,
2010).
The present article takes up the comparative perspective by applying more recent
data and a detailed identification of the national business cycles. Based here on it is
discussed, whether the concrete manner in which the crisis has spelled itself out on the
Danish labour market is related to the specific balance between flexibility and security
that characterises the Danish model.
Following the analysis of the Danish labour market performance during the crisis in a
comparative perspective, the article furthermore gives an broad overview of the actual
Danish policy responses to the crisis both at the macro-level and with respect to labour
market policy. It then discusses the degree to which the policies do – or do not – re-
flect a distinct approach linked to the Danish flexicurity-regime. To which degree do
the policy responses support or divert from the main characteristics of the model? This
analysis will be based on a mapping of Danish employment policy since 2008.
Finally the article assesses the outcomes of the functioning of the Danish flexicurity
model during the crisis. Has the Danish model in effect been able to provide security
for wage earners in times of severe economic crisis?2. The crisis on the Danish labour market: a comparative perspective
One of the aspects of Danish labour market performance, which has been noted in
recent years, is the rapid rise in unemployment. In June 2008, Denmark flagged the
lowest rate of unemployment in the European Union. In December 2012 Denmark had
dropped to being no. 12 in the rank and only 2.7 percentage points below the average
unemployment level of EU-27 (Eurostat, 2013).
In Figure 1 the relative increase in unemployment rates in the EU Members States is
shown, while Figure 2 depicts the increase in unemployment rates in percentage points.
In both figures the underlying data cover the period from the beginning of 2007 to the
third quarter of 2012. However, since the Member States were hit by the crisis at differ-
ent points in time, the increases in unemployment rates in the figures are measured
from individual starting and ending points for each country and thus reflect the

























Relative increase in unemployment (Minimum=1)
Figure 1 Relative increase in unemployment from national minimum to 2012Q3 or national
maximum if earlier than 2012Q3. Observation period 2007Q1 to 2012Q3. Source: Calculated by the
author on the basis of LFS, Eurostat.
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takes into account the different timing of the national downturn, it implies a bias in the
sense that a few of the observations are “right-censored” by the last observation
(2012Q3), which will not for all countries be the bottom of the national business cycle
measured by the unemployment rate. However, until information is available for all
countries for the full period of the present crisis, this is the only practical approach.
Based on the information in Figures 1 and 2 there is little doubt than Denmark is
found among the countries, where both the relative and the absolute increase in un-
employment has been most dramatic. In relative terms Denmark is only surpassed by
the Baltic States, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Since Denmark entered the crisis with a
very low level of unemployment, the relative increase is somewhat biased. However,
also measured by the absolute increase shown in Figure 2, Denmark is clearly above
the average for the EU-27.
The rapid increase in Danish unemployment could of course reflect an equally dra-
matic fall in employment. In Figure 3 the fall in employment is compared. Again the
change in employment is measured taking into account the national development of
the business cycle. The starting quarter is thus the quarter with the highest employ-
ment level since the beginning of 2007 and the ending quarter is the lowest level found
since the peak, which only for Greece, Spain and Portugal is the last quarter in the
sample (2012Q3).

























Increase in unemployment rate (percentage points) 
Figure 2 Increase in unemployment in percentage points from national minimum to 2012Q3 or
national maximum if earlier than 2012Q3. Observation period 2007Q1 to 2012Q3. Source: Calculated by
the author on the basis of LFS, Eurostat.
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pears dramatic with a decline in employment, which is significantly above the average
for the EU-27. The same goes for the decline in GDP, cf. Figure 4.
Finally Figure 5 presents the employment elasticity with respect to GDP defined as
the relation between the relative change in employment and in GDP (both calculated
from peak to through). Poland is omitted from Figures 4 and 5 due to the exceptional
development in its GDP, which hitherto has not been declining during the economic
crisis.
The immediate impression from Figure 5 is that the relationship between the change
in GDP and in employment in the Danish case clearly above the European average.
Given the wide-spread notion of Denmark as having a labour market characterized by
a high level of numerical flexibility, this comes as no surprise. Especially one also notes
that Denmark has a relatively high elasticity of employment to GDP, if one solely looks
at the old Member States. Here Denmark is only surpassed by Spain, Portugal and
Ireland. Similar calculations presented in European Commission (2010:28) indicate a
similar ranking of countries with respect to their of employment elasticities of GDP,
although there are some differences in the level of the elasticities probably due to dif-
ferences in the time periods for which data have been available at the time of the calcu-
lation and also because the Commissions’ calculations are based on the same time
period for all countries.

























Figure 3 Relative decline in employment from national peak to national minimum. Observation
period 2007Q1 to 2012Q3. Source: Calculated by the author on the basis of LFS, Eurostat.
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change in GDP and employment (measured in persons) and other macro-economic
variables like productivity and average working hours, which act as “buffers” between
the change in GDP and the resulting change in employment. However, the employment
elasticities calculated above are somewhat higher than those published elsewhere,
which have indicated that Denmark is among the countries, where the response of
employment to the decline in production has been around average (Andersen, 2012;
Eichhorst et al, 2010; Leschke & Watt, 2010; OECD, 2010). Possible explanations for
this new result can be that the present calculations are based on newer data, and that
they also take the specific timing of the national business cycle into account.
Summing up the impression of the impact of the economic crisis on the Danish
labour market one can thus make the following observations:
 Both the absolute and the relative increase in unemployment are in the high end of
the spectrum, especially compared to the old Member States
 The same goes for the decline in employment relative to the fall in GDP
(the elasticity of employment)

























Figure 4 Relative decline in GDP from national peak to national minimum. Observation period 2007Q1
to 2012Q3. Source: Calculated by the author on the basis of Eurostat.
Madsen IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:6 Page 6 of 19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6Both these observations are thus consistent with the hypothesis that the high level of
external numerical flexibility of the Danish labour market – corresponding to a rela-
tively low level of EPL – will lead to more volatile changes in unemployment and
employment over the business cycle. This of course will go both ways and also imply
that employment will catch up rather rapidly, when an upswing occurs. Furthermore
one must stress that a high level of internal numerical flexibility (working time flexibil-
ity) also plays an important role on the Danish labour market. Without the flexibility of
working hours one would have expected the decline in employment (measured in
persons) to have been even higher.
Finally one however should point to the fact that there are – in a cross-country com-
parison - no simple correlations between the elasticity of employment (in persons) with
respect to GDP and institutional variables like the level of employment protection legis-
lation. As indicated by the case of for instance the UK, where employment protection
is generally assessed as rather low, other intervening factors like productivity and wage
flexibility can play an important role and lead to deviations from a simple relationship
between EPL and the employment elasticity. Another example is Spain, where the EPL
for ordinary workers is high, but one still observes a high employment elasticity due to
the large share of temporary employees on the Spanish labour market. At the other end of
the spectrum Germany stands out with a very low employment elasticity as a reflection of























Figure 5 Elasticity of employment with respect to GDP, national peak to national minimum.
Observation period 2007Q1 to 2012Q3. Source: Calculated from data in Figures 3 and 4.
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on the German labour market during the crisis.
One of the most striking observations from the crisis has thus been the diversity in
the way in which the crisis has played itself out on the national labour markets of the
EU. Also when it came to the consequences of the crisis on the labour market, one size
did not fit all.3. Changes in employment and labour market policies since the crisis
Following this brief comparative exposition of the changes on the Danish labour market,
we now turn to the political reactions to the crisis. Which policies have been enacted in
order to provide “shelter against the wind”? Do the Danish policy responses to the crisis
reflect a particular “flexicurity profile” and – following that – can the responses be con-
ceived at sustainable in the sense that there are no indications of serious barriers to the
implementation of such policies? Or has the stress of the crisis lead to a dismantling of
the basic pillars of the model?
This section therefore presents the major policy initiatives, which have been taken as
a response to the crisis since 2008.
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macro-economic policy and labour market policy. After an overview of the policy shifts
in the respective areas, the text goes on to discuss the issues of conformity with the
Danish flexicurity model and its sustainability.3.1 Fiscal policy initiatives
The rapid rise in unemployment during the fall of 2008 and the following winter put the
issue of “growth packages” high on the political agenda. Since the spring of 2009 a number
of concrete expansionary measures have been undertaken. The measures introduced
during 2009 and subsequent years include access for the municipalities to increase their
investments beyond the existing spending limit, a state subsidy to renovation of private
and several public “investment packages” in infrastructure, energy saving etc. Further-
more, taking effect from 2010, a tax reform was introduced, which was not fully financed
during the initial years.
To these discretionary fiscal policy measures must be added the fact the Danish econ-
omy due to its rather high tax level and the large share of the workforce covered by
unemployment benefits, has some of the largest built-in automatic stabilizers in the
EU, cf. Figure 4 (Dolls et al, 2009). Thus the effects of the economic downturn on
income and unemployment are significantly dampened. The backside of this is of
course that the public budgets have deteriorated rather dramatically during the crisis.
Later developments in Danish macro-economic policy have however represented a
stepping back from the expansionary fiscal policy of 2009 and 2010. Triggered by rising
deficits on the public budgets and a recommendation from the European Commission
to restrict the deficits, the Conservative-Liberal Government in May 2010 began polit-
ical negations with the Danish People’s Party, which rapidly resulted in a political agree-
ment for fiscal recovery to be implemented in 2011 and subsequent years. Important
elements in the agreement were combined savings and reallocation of public expend-
iture and a temporary hold on the indexation of the tax scale, which implies a de facto
tax increase. The agreement also implied a cap over the yearly amount of membership
fee for trade unions, which the members can deduct, when calculating taxable income
and rising fees for labour market training. These elements were of course fiercely
opposed by the trade unions.
However, the most controversial elements in the agreement was a shortening of the
duration of unemployment benefits from four to two years and a tightening of the
criteria for regaining access to unemployment benefits, once the right to benefits had
been exhausted. These elements are further discussed below.
In the subsequent years the issue of “growth packages” and “kick starts” has remained
high on the political agenda, also stimulated by the change of Government in October
2011. The new Government was formed by a coalition of socialists, social democrats
and social liberals under the social democratic prime minister Helle Thorning Schmidt.
The Government has however chosen a cautious strategy with respect to fiscal expansion
putting great emphasis on the need to obey the recommendation from the European
Commission.
Taking the period as a whole, according to the latest available estimates from the


















Figure 6 The stance of fiscal policy measured by the one-year fiscal effect on GDP, 2007-2013.
Source: Finansministeriet 2012, table. 4.9.
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year fiscal effect. For 2011 the fiscal effect was strongly negative mainly due to a decline
in public consumption of -1.5 percent in real term. Also rising taxes contributed to the
tightening of fiscal policy. In 2012 fiscal policy was almost neutral, while the fiscal effect
in 2013 is again estimated to be negative by -0.3 percent. Thus there is a clear shift in
fiscal policy from the first two years of the crisis to more recently, where the austerity
pressure has set in. Not surprisingly this development has caused a heated policy
debate about, whether the Government is conducting a fiscal policy, which is overly
tight and implies the risk of causing severe structural damages to the economy and the
labour market. Going further into this issue is however outside the scope of present
article.3.2 Working-time and wage-flexibility
When it comes to direct intervention in the labour market a number of measures have
been taken during since the beginning of the crisis. Thus, in March 2009 the existing
option for employers to reduce working hours in case of a temporary fall in the de-
mand for its products was made more flexible. The scheme operates under the heading
of “work sharing” and implies that the workers alternate between periods of work and
periods, where they receive unemployment benefits. Normally the maximum duration
of work sharing is 13 weeks, but employers can apply for a prolongation by another 13
weeks.
While the reform allowed for increased flexibility during the 26 weeks that are the
maximum duration of work sharing, it was still seen as a temporary solution that was
not aimed at handling a prolonged economic downturn. Some employers called for the
introduction of a longer duration of the support to work-sharing, but both the social
partners and the political actors were reluctant to support this idea out of fear that this
would simply introduce a permanent wage subsidy to declining branches and companies.
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total of 25.000 workers took part in work sharing. By the end of 2012, their number had
fallen to about 2,000 persons.
Concerning flexible working time arrangements, the Danish collective agreements
normally allow for such arrangements to be agreed at the firm level. No changes in this
situation have been introduced recently.
Finally with respect to wage moderation, some employers and their organizations
have aired the possibility of voluntary wage reductions as a crisis measure, but there
are only few examples of actual nominal wage moderation yet. However, one can add
the observation that the general negotiations in the private sector in the spring of 2010
and again in the spring of 2012 resulted in wage increases that were very modest in a
historical perspective and for most groups implied falling real wages. Also the wage ne-
gotiations in the public sector in the spring of 2011 lead to fairly small wage increases,
which will after correction for inflation lead to significant reductions in real wages for
the public employees.
The most notable element in the collective agreements in the private sector in the
spring of 2010 was the introduction of severance pay for blue-collar workers, who had
been employed for more than 3 years. The actual amount was rather modest and to be
calculated as the difference between one month’s actual wage and unemployment benefits
with a deduction of 15 percent. After 6 years of employment the double amount is paid
and after eight years three time this amount. The actual severance pay after 3 years of
employment will be around between 7,000 and 10,000 DKK (930 to 1400 Euro). In the
collective agreements conducted in the private sector in the spring of 2012 this new elem-
ent was further enhanced. The main argument of the trade unions for demanding this
new element in the collective agreements was the decline in the income security provided
by the UI-system due to the declining replacement rate since the early1980s, the shorten-
ing of the duration of unemployment benefits to two years to be implemented from 2012-
2013 and the tightening of the access to regain the right to benefits: As mentioned above,
the latter two changes were part of the agreement for fiscal recovery from May 2010.3.3 Changes to the content of ALMP
In February 2009, a broad political agreement was reached inspired by a proposal from
the social partners. It implied a number of changes in the rules for active labour market
programs. The changes were all aimed at targeting the programs more towards upgrad-
ing the skills of the unemployed in the light of the composition of labour demand.
Furthermore one of the initiatives made by the Minister of Employment in March 2009
implied that the funds allocated to assist employees that are affected by collective
dismissals are increased. Furthermore, the Minister of Employment in January 2010
announced new initiatives to assist employers that are restructuring and employees that
are about to be dismissed. These initiatives were in part inspired by a joint set of pro-
posals from the social partners, who in January 2010 published 23 concrete proposals
to improve employment policy and combat long-term unemployment (LO and DA,
2010). All in all, these initiatives implied a slightly higher priority to education and
training and also more intensive contact with the unemployed in the form of frequent
meetings with counselors at the job-centre.
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cratic Prime Minister took office. The Government announced a number of reforms of
labour market policy and retirement schemes, the latter including the disability pension
and the flexi-job-scheme. The most important elements can be summarized in the fol-
lowing points:
 The access to education for unemployed was widened and recipients of cash
benefits, which have other problems than just unemployment, were now to be
activated every 12 months (instead of 6) to allow for a more flexible activation of
this vulnerable target group.
 More effective efforts to reduce youth unemployment including more job-rotation
for young persons, more young to take part in the adult-apprenticeship-scheme,
targeted programmes for young persons with lack of basic education and more
traineeships for graduates.
 Strengthened efforts to reduce the drop-out-rate especially from the vocational
education system.
Thus, while not representing a drastic break with previous policies, the many minor
reforms can be interpreted as pointing toward a more flexible approach to active labour
market policy and also implies the allocation of more resources to interventions.
The issue of reforms of the organization, steering and financing of active labour mar-
ket policy has been postponed several time (following failed tripartite negotiations in
June 2012). A new attempt to deal with these complicated matters was announced by
the Government in February 2013. An expert committee and a committee of social
partners shall work in parallel to develop solutions during 2013 and 2014.
In quantitative terms Figure 7 sums up the development in the priorities of active
labour market policy during the crisis. The main message from Figure 7 is that the
element of counseling, training and education in active programs has been reduced











Counselling, training and education Traineeship with employers Employment with wage subsidy
Figure 7 The main programmes of Danish active labour market policy 2007-2012. Source: Databanks
of Statistics Denmark.
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politicians. Actually the mandate of the expert committee just mentioned call for an in-
vestigation of the potential for increasing the role of education in active labour market
policy.3.4 Reform of the unemployment benefit system for insured unemployed
The most disputed measure being part of the plan for fiscal recovery from June 2010
was a reform of the unemployment benefit system, originally to be implemented from
mid-2012. The aim of the reform is to increase the supply of labour by motivating un-
employed to look for work more eagerly after a shorter duration of unemployment out
of fear for exhausting their benefits. It has the following elements:
 Previously, an insured unemployed could receive unemployment benefits for four
years out of the last six years. After the reform the maximum period will be two
years out of the last three years.
 The conditions for regaining the right to unemployment benefits were harmonised
with the rules for qualifying for benefits for the first time. In both cases the criteria
will be 52 weeks of full-time employment during the last three years. Before the
reform, the requirement for regaining the right to benefits was only 26 weeks.
Not surprisingly, the trade unions have strongly opposed the reform of the un-
employment benefit system, which they see as undermining the most important elem-
ent of income security in the Danish model. They furthermore stress that the reform
came on top of a gradual erosion of the compensation rate of unemployment benefits
relative to gross wage, which had taken place since the early 1980s, and are also wor-
ried that the reform will increase the decline in the membership of unemployment in-
surance funds, which has also been a long-standing feature of the Danish labour
market for decades. By example the share of insured employees in the workforce fell
from 78.4 percent in 1999 to 73.9 percent in 2009.
When the reform was decided in May 2010, the expectation among policy-makers
was that unemployment would gradually decline towards 2012. However this hope was
not fulfilled. As a response the new Government postponed the implementation of the
reform by extending the duration of unemployment benefits for insured unemployed
by half a year for all unemployed, who would have exhausted their unemployment ben-
efits in the second half of 2012. However, this moratorium only delayed the date, when
large groups lose their right to unemployment insurance to the beginning of 2013.
In the fall of 2012, the reaction of the Government to rising criticism for cynicism
towards the long-term unemployed was the introduction of a number of “acute mea-
sures” to assist the long-term unemployed, who were at risk of losing the right to bene-
fits in the spring of 2013. The measures included more intense counselling and
activation and also a subsidy to make employers give priority to long-term unemployed
when hiring for vacant positions. Furthermore unemployed who exhausted the right to
unemployment benefits would become entitled to a new educational benefit for up to
six months, if they undertook training after dropping out of the benefit system. The
new benefit is equal to social assistance and thus somewhat lower than normal
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duration of benefits was still one of the hottest on the Danish political agenda.
Apart from the direct interference with the benefit system, the now former Conservative
Liberal Government also in May 2011 reformed the so-called Voluntary Early Retirement
Pay, which under certain conditions allowed member of unemployment insurance funds
to retire at the age of 60 years and receive a pension similar to UI-benefits until the age of
65. The new political agreement on retirement reform implied that the age for entering
the in the VERP was gradually increased by half a year each year from 2014 to 2017. Also
the VERP was changed into a three-year scheme compared to the existing five years.
At the same time the so-called flexi-job-scheme providing a permanent wage subsidy
to disabled persons was made more restrictive by limiting the duration of the wage
subsidy to five years. For persons aged above 40 years, the wage subsidy may thereafter
become permanent. Also limits were put on the size of the wage subsidy. The employer,
the employee and the municipality must prepare a plan aimed at having the employee
return to normal employment.
In addition to the shortening of the benefit period, these reforms have added to a
widespread feeling among trade unions and wage earners in general that the safety nets
of the Danish labour market are under erosion.4. Summing up the policy response: a labour market on auto-pilot?
In assessing the policy responses to the crisis since 2008, one must highlight that
Danish labour market policy to a large degree is “rule-based” in the sense that the law
on active employment policy in detail specifies a number of rights and obligations for
the unemployed and the jobcentres. Among the most important ones are individual
dead-lines for contacts with the job-centre and for taking part in mandatory active
programmes. This implies for instance that an unemployed member of an unemploy-
ment insurance fund must be activated after 9 months of unemployment or 3 months,
if the person is aged less than 30 years. Unemployed aged 60 years and above are acti-
vated after 6 months of unemployment
This rather strict regime of monitoring and activation is not related to the business
cycle. As also noted by the ILO, Danish labour market policy therefore has the charac-
ter of an automatic stabiliser, where there is little need for discretionary actions to be
taken under a downturn (ILO, 2009:23).
This role is reinforced by the universal character of Danish labour market policy,
which encompasses the vast majority of wage-earners (and self-employed) due to their
membership of an unemployment insurance fund or access to means tested social se-
curity. Thus, according to a study from the Economic Council of the Labour Move-
ment, 85 percent of the employed would qualify for unemployment benefits or social
security, if becoming unemployed (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 2010a).
The major challenge in this context is of course the necessity to adjust the resources
of the jobcentres to accommodate to the larger inflow of unemployed that follows from
fall in employment. There are indications that the jobcentres have faced severe difficul-
ties in meeting the deadlines. Thus in January 2010 only 58 percent of the insured un-
employed started activation in time. For young unemployed aged less than 30 years this
was the case for only 42 percent (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 2010b).
Madsen IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:6 Page 14 of 19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6Both when it comes to macro-economic policies and labour market policies a charac-
teristic feature of the Danish policy response is thus its non-discretionary nature. This
goes both for the important role of strong automatic stabilisers in the macro-economy
and for the rule-based and universalistic nature of labour market policy. In spite of the,
one could of course have expected that the crisis had lead to large scale policy reforms
that more profoundly changed the Danish labour market model . As described above
the response to the crisis has hitherto been within well-known policy boundaries.
Applying the classic taxonomy of Hall (1993) one could say that the Danish employ-
ment policy has been mainly characterized by first first-order changes, where existing
policy instruments are adjusted, but not radically changed.
However one can also identify in some examples of second-order changes, where
new instruments are introduced. Thus although “growth packages” have also been ap-
plied during previous economic downturns, the strong focus on the need to stimulate
job creation in 2009-10 can be interpreted as a policy shift.
Within labour market policy, the shortening of the duration of unemployment bene-
fits from 4 to 2 years that was decided in May 2010 can be interpreted as another im-
portant second-order change, given the fact that the duration of benefits had not been
applied as a policy instrument since the late 1990s and then in a much less controver-
sial setting given the steady decline in unemployment at the time.
Table 1 sums up the picture.
Among Danish academics it is sometimes argued that the first- and second-order
changes described above have already lead to a fundamental change in the Danish
flexicurity-model, which makes it relevant to consider it as now being fundamentally
different from the model that we have previously known. Whether or not to subscribe
to this view is a matter of judgment. When one is in the middle of a historical process
it is always hard to assess to degree to which it will later be seen as leading to more
fundamental transformations.
However, the present author tend to subscribe to the view that the Danish model of
flexicurity is still basically intact and retains the same characteristics that is has had for
decades. Although some reforms have been introduced in recent years, policy-makers
still support the main characteristics of the model. An explanation for this situation
could be that the Danish policy arrangements have in fact managed to handle many ofTable 1 An overview of Danish policy reactions to the crisis
Degree of discreation Automatic Discretionary
Policy area
Macro-economic policy Strong automatic stabilisers due to high
tax-rates and income support to
unemployed
Growth packages mainly focused on
public investments and tax reductions
Labour market policy Rule-based system of active measures
targeted at all unemployed recipients of
transfer income (UI and cash benefits)
A number of minor adjustments to the
various active measures.
Initiatives to combat youth
unemployment
A wide coverage of income support
systems in the form of unemployment
insurance and cash benefits for
non-insured unemployed
Shortening the duration of benefits from
4 to 2 years and tightening the criteria
for regaining the right to benefits
“Acute packages” for LTU exhausting
their right to benefits from
unemployment insurance
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support of this argument is that the speed in the rise of registered unemployment has
leveled out during the spring of 2009 and that the forecasts for economic growth are
improving somewhat from the disastrous decline in GDP of between 4 and 5 percent
in 2009. Thus forecasters publish expected growth rates for 2012 and 2013 around 1
percent. This will not be sufficient to rapidly restore employment and unemployment
to their pre-crisis levels, but will at least prevent them from a continued dramatic
deterioration.
Pointing to the stability of the basic elements of Danish flexicurity does not imply
that nothing has changed or that nothing will change in the coming years. To the con-
trary it is evident that the policy changes described in section 3 have put the traditional
pillars of the Danish model of flexicurity under stress, but without fundamentally
corrupting the functioning of the model.
Table 2 sums up the observations of the stress factors with respect to the three pillars
that are traditionally applied in describing the Danish labour market from a flexicurity
perspective. First of all it is beyond doubt that the level of income support provided by
the unemployment benefit system has declined along a number of dimensions. Sec-
ondly the crisis had put pressure on active labour market policy, where one has also
seen a deliberate policy change toward less counselling and training. Finally the intro-
duction of minor elements of severance pay is a small step towards more restrictive
employment protection. A number of small steps have been taken that – if they turn
into a long walk – will transform the Danish version of flexicurity.5. Has the Danish model provided shelter from the storm?
As described in detail above, the crisis has implied a dramatic rise in unemployment
and substantial fall in employment. Also the labour force has been reduced due to the
lack of demand. Long-term unemployment has more than doubled. Especially young
workers, unskilled workers and immigrants and non-insured unemployed are severely
affected by unemployment.Table 2 Stress factors with respect to the main components of the Danish flexicurity
model
Flexicurity pillar Stress factors(s)
Income support to unemployed covering the
majority of wage earners for an extended period of
time and with a relatively high compensation rate
(especially for low-income groups)
•The shortening of the duration of unemployment
benefits from 4 to 2 years taking full effect from 2013
•A gradual decline in the compensation rate of
unemployment benefits relative to wages since the
early 1980s
•A decline in the share of workers that enroll in UI-funds
Active labour market policies emphasizing early
activation and upgrading of the skills of the
unemployed
•A falling share of unemployed taking part in
counseling and training programs
•Problems for the job-centers in keeping the deadlines
with respect to activation of the unemployed
A flexible labour market with a high degree of
external numerical flexibility
•The introduction of minor elements of severance pay
for blue-collar workers in the collective agreements in
the affective compensation rate of the UI-system and
the shortening of duration of benefits. This opens for
further increases in the future rounds of negotiation.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6A further issue is the adequacy of income support. As already described, about 85
percent of the employed will receive some form of income support, if becoming un-
employed. The backside hereof is of course, that 15 percent will be without any safety
net and also not eligible for receiving the offers of active labour market policy. The ris-
ing number of persons reporting as unemployed in the Labour Force Surveys, but not
being registered as unemployed at the job-centers, could be another indication of the
limits of Danish income security. Also, the declining membership of the unemployment
insurance funds may to some degree be caused by the erosion of the replacement rates
of unemployment benefits, which has taken place since the 1980s.
But on the other hand, there are also indicators that the Danish version of flexicurity
is still providing the Danish labour market with some shelter against the crisis.
Firstly, while long-term unemployment is on the rise, its level is still among the low-
est in the EU. In the 3rd quarter of 2012, the share of the long-term unemployed in
total unemployment was 28 percent according to the European LFS, which was among
the lowest numbers found in the EU (cf. Figure 8). For EU-27 the share of long-term



























Figure 8 The share of long-term unemployed (> 12 months) in total unemployment, 2008Q3 and
2012Q3. Source: Eurostat LFS.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6risen faster than the EU-average. Thus in the 3rd quarter of 2008, the Danish share of
LTU was only 12 percent, while the EU-average was 36 percent.
Second, the basic security arrangements in the form of income security and active
labour market policy are still functioning in spite of the increased pressure from the
crisis on the labour market. One indication hereof is the observation that Danes rank
very low in studies of the economic hardship caused by the crisis (Eurobarometer,
2012). When asked about whether the household has run out of money to pay ordinary
bills, buy food or other daily consumer items during the last 12 months, 8 percent of
the Danes answer positively. This is together with Sweden the lowest share in the EU-
27, where the average is 18 percent. When asked about, whether they are able to keep
up with household bills and credit commitments, 79 percent of the Danish household
state that they can keep up without any difficulties. This is the highest share in the EU,
where the average is 44 percent.
When it comes to the “political sustainability” of the Danish version of flexicurity, the
support to the present state of affairs with respect to Danish flexicurity seems to be
there - even in times of crisis. Or to quote the former Minister of Employment:
Still, I have faith in flexicurity. It will serve us well in both the best and the worst of
times. Flexicurity allows us to adjust to the changes in the market, and it secures the
livelihood of the unemployed (Frederiksen, 2009, p. 2)
One should mention that he also in the same speech stresses the need for reforms,
but only to preserve the model, not to dismantle it. A similar positive assessment of
flexicurity is also expressed by the OECD (2012:13-14):
Flexicurity should help Denmark both during hard times and to achieve strong eco-
nomic growth over the longer term…This model fosters low unemployment and high
employment but it may be tested by prolonged periods of low labour demand…
The Danish welfare system acts as a buffer in periods of crisis. While GDP per capita
has lost some ground relative to the upper half of OECD countries, well-being in
terms of both material conditions and quality of life is very high . This is the result of
a well-functioning labour market and a well-developed and generous welfare system
that includes social policies directed at helping those with the lowest incomes, broad
access to education and free access to most health services. This system is costly,
however, with Denmark spending more than 20% of GDP on social policies. Even so,
net public social spending is higher in a number of OECD countries where poverty is
more prevalent.
Of course there can be a thin line between conducting a more wide-ranging renova-
tion and genuine demolition. Thus the shortening of the duration of unemployment
benefits and the tightening of the access to regaining the right of benefits was con-
ceived – with support from the OECD – by the same Minister Frederiksen, who is
quoted above.
This critique was also expressed by the leader of the Social Democratic Party, now
Prime Minister, who in several interviews during the summer of 2010 argued that the
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6long duration of unemployment benefits was essential for keeping the balance in
the Danish model of flexicurity. However, given the present balance of power in the
Danish parliament, it is unlikely that one will see a return to the former four year
duration.
6. Conclusion
Summing, up the available evidence, Danish flexicurity seems to be able to provide
some shelter against the storm of the crisis. It also seems to be reasonably robust
against political interventions of a more drastic nature that would go far in dismantling
the traditional Danish version of flexicurity. On the other hand it is evident that the
combination of policy changes and the economic crisis has put the model under stress
compared to its latest heydays during the long upswing of from 1993 to 2008.
The balance between flexibility and security has without doubt drifted away from the
equilibrium that until recently gave the Danish model the widespread support from
most political parties and the social partners. Whether a new balance can be found –
not far from the old one – will depend on the political developments and the reactions
of the trade unions over the coming years. If institutions providing income and employ-
ment security are further eroded, and if the response from the trade unions is claims
for more traditional job security, it could mean a gradual farewell to “flexicurity in
Danish”.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of European Labor Studies is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The
author declares that he has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my colleagues at CARMA and professor John L. Campbell for commenting on various versions of the
article and on a related paper published in Danish in 2011. I have also benefitted from the comments of two
anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.
Responsible editor: Martin Kahanec
Received: 14 February 2013 Accepted: 18 June 2013
Published: 8 July 2013
References
Andersen TM (2012) A flexicurity labour market in the great recession: The case of Denmark. De Economist
Andersen TM, Svarer M (2012) Active labour market policies in a recession. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 1:7
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (2010a) 370.000 danskere uden mulighed for dagpenge eller kontanthjælp,
København
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (2010b) Jobcentre bryder loven. , København
Bredgaard T, Larsen F, Madsen PK (2006) “Opportunities and challenges for flexicurity – The Danish example”,
Transfer – European Review of Labour and Research. Volume 12(1):61–82
Bredgaard T, Larsen F, Madsen PK (2007) The challenges of identifying flexicurity in action - A case study on Denmark.
In: Jørgensen H, Madsen PK (ed) Flexicurity and beyond: finding a new agenda for the European social model. DJØF
Publishing, Copenhagen, pp 365–391
Dolls M, Fuest C, Peichl A (2009) Automatic Stabilizers and Economic Crisis: US vs. Europe. CESIFO WORKING PAPER
NO. 2878
Eichhorst W, Feil M, Marx P (2010) Crisis, What Crisis? Patterns of Adaptation in European Labor Markets. IZA Discussion
Papers no. 5045, July 2010 (www.iza.org)
Eurobarometer (2012) Monitoring the social impact of the crisis Wave 6. Flash EB No. 338, April 2012
European Commission (2006) Employment in Europe. , Luxembourg
European Commission (2010) 2010. Employment in Europe, Luxembourg
Eurostat (2013) New Release Euroindicators no. , Luxembourg
Frederiksen CH (2009) Speech, London School of Economics. March 16, 2009 (www.bm.dk)
Hall P (1993) Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain.
Comparative Politics 25(3):275–296
ILO (2009) Protecting people, promoting jobs. A survey of country employment and social protection policy responses
to the global economic crisis. An ILO report to the G20 Leaders’ Summit,Pittsburgh, Geneva
Leschke J, Watt A (2010) “How do institutions affect the labour market adjustment to the economic crisis in different
EU countries?”, Working Paper. ETUI, Bruxelles
Madsen IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:6 Page 19 of 19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/6LO and DA (2010) 23 initiativer til at målrette beskæftigelsesindsatsen og modvirke langtidsledighed. www.lo.dk
Madsen PK (2006) “How can in possibly fly? The paradox of a dynamic labour market in a Scandinavian welfare state”.
In: Campbell JA, Hall JA, Pedersen OK (ed) National Identity and the varieties of Capitalism: THE DANISH EXPERIENCE.
McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, pp 321–355
OECD (2010) “Labour markets and the crisis”, Economics Department Working Papers No. 756. OECD, Paris
OECD (2012) OECD Economic Surveys Denmark January. , Parisdoi:10.1186/2193-9012-2-6
Cite this article as: Madsen: “Shelter from the storm?” - Danish flexicurity and the crisis. IZA Journal of European
Labor Studies 2013 2:6.Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
